)>IJH=?J Empirical evidence suggests trade coercion exercised unilaterally is signicantly less likely to induce concessions than coercion exercised through an international organization.
Introduction
In international trade disputes, coercion is often used against governments whose trade practices are deemed unfair. Trade coercion occurs when a sender government makes a demand backed by threats to use retaliatory sanctions against a target government if the latter does not acquiesce to this demand. There are typically two distinct methods of trade coercion: it can be exercised unilaterally or through multilateral institutions (e.g. GATT and WTO) . In the case of unilateral coercion, the sender government makes a demand and (if necessary) retaliates one-sidedly, unconstrained by international obligations.
In the case of multilateral coercion, the sender uses instead an international institution's framework for trade dispute resolution.
In this paper, we build on an empirical puzzle to develop a theory of trade coercion. The puzzle concerns the eectiveness of unilateral and multilateral coercions in getting target countries to concede to senders' demands: Empirical evidence (e.g. Busch 2000 and Pelc 2010) reveals in fact that a target of trade coercion from the US is signicantly less likely to concede when coercion is unilateral than when it is multilateral. Given that neither GATT nor the WTO possess centralized enforcement power (Busch and Reinhardt 2000) , the fact that these multilateral institutions can increase the chances of a sender government obtaining a concession presents an empirical puzzle. Why does unilateral coercion signicantly reduce the likelihood of a target conceding? How can international trade institutions be eective if defendants can reject adverse rulings with impunity?
We address these questions by developing a theoretical model, which allow us to analyze the strategic incentives underlying trade coercion under three dierent institutional settings. The model depicts a dispute between two states, Home and Foreign, in which the Foreign government is dissatised with the trade policy implemented by the Home government. A key feature of trade coercion is the target government's lack of information on the sender government's domestic political constraints (e.g. Busch and Reinhardt 2000 , Bagwell and Staiger 2005 and Beshkar and Bond 2012 . To capture this idea, we assume that the political pressure exerted by the import-competing sector on the government in Foreign is private information, and is only known by the Foreign government. This political pressure plays a key role in shaping its level of resolve i.e. the severity of its trade sanctions against the Home government in a potential trade war.
Appraising the actual eectiveness of an international organization in dispute settlement A typical example was Section 301 of the 1974 US Trade Act, which allowed the United States to impose unilateral sanctions on countries whose trade practices were found to be unfair to US interests. This clause was invoked in several occasions for instance in the much publicized dispute with Japan over automobiles of 1995, in which the US essentially bypassed the WTO and imposed sanctions unilaterally (see Puckett and Reynolds 1996 and Schoppa 1999) .
The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism is the leading institution of this kind, and since its inception, it has handled hundreds of cases. Several preferential trade agreements also include similar institutions. See for instance NAFTA's Dispute Settlement Process or MERCOSUR's Dispute Settlement Mechanism. requires knowing what would happen if that institution did not exist i.e. if there were no framework of rules governing trade coercion. For this reason, the rst setting we examine is one in which unilateral coercion is the only option. The game begins with the Foreign government making a demand. The Home government can concede (ending the game with the implementation of the demanded tari ), or reject it (triggering a retaliatory trade war). In other words, it must decide which concessions are acceptable, that is, which tari changes it would prefer to make rather than face Foreign's trade sanctions. Since the precise nature of these sanctions is uncertain and crucially depends on the privately observed level of resolve of the Foreign government, the latter has incentives to signal high levels of resolve by making excessive demands about the concessions required from Home to avoid retaliatory measures.
Our characterization of equilibrium outcomes in this case reveals that such incentives lead the Foreign government to make requests that the Home government will not meet, thus causing a retaliatory trade war even when there exist mutually advantageous policy concessions.
This nding provides a possible explanation for the empirically observed lower eectiveness of unilateral coercion in obtaining concessions from target governments.
As we will show, a key factor in determining whether concessions can be obtained with multilateral coercion is the extent to which the sender government can commit not to bypass the dispute settlement process of the international organization through which coercion is channeled. To model the dierent strategic situations that may arise from dierences in the sender's ability to commit to the international organization, we will examine two distinct variants of the previous model. In the rst, the Foreign government is not allowed to bypass the international organization's dispute settlement process. As a result, multilateral coercion is its only option available. Dispute settlement is modeled by allowing the Foreign government to make a demand to the Home government prior to the international organization ruling. This assumption is intended to capture, e.g. the consultations stage of WTO disputes. If the Home government does not concede to the Foreign government's demand the international organization issues its ruling, whereas it remains inactive otherwise. As our aim is to investigate the eectiveness of weak international trade institutions namely those that have no enforcement power and rely on the sender government itself to implement any retaliatory measures the Home government is allowed not to comply with the ruling, thus triggering a trade war with the Foreign government. Our analysis shows that commitment to the international organization's ruling makes concessions more likely. Intuitively, the potential IO ruling places a cap on the Foreign government's incentives to signal its resolve with high demands. This results in the latter making more moderate requests, which can be accepted by Home.
In the second variant of the model, the Foreign government is only partially committed to the international organization's dispute settlement process, in the sense that it can choose between unilateral and multilateral coercion in an additional stage at the beginning of the game, committing itself to that choice.
! This setting captures the environment created by
Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. In fact, this provision enabled the President to impose sanctions unilaterally against unfair trade practices, eliminating the need to observe existing international obligations (e.g. Puckett and Reynolds 1996) . We show that the mere availability of the unilateral option prevents the foreign government from obtaining concessions in equilibrium. In fact, using multilateral coercion when unilateral coercion is available is perceived as a sign of the foreign government's weakness. Hence, incentives to signal higher levels of resolve to the Home government will lead the Foreign government to make unilateral demands which, as discussed above, cannot be accepted in equilibrium.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to provide a formal analysis of trade coercion. A large body of literature has studied international trade agreements as subgame perfect equilibria of innitely-repeated prisoner-dilemma games, in which deviations from the (implicit) agreements are followed by indenite play of high-tari Nash equilibria. Papers in that literature study how international organizations' dispute settlement procedures can facilitate cooperation e.g. Maggi (1999) , Ludema (2001) , Klimenko, Ramey, and Watson (2008) , Limão and Saggi (2008), and Park (2011) . However, in this tradition, trade dispute settlement is modeled as a set of conditions imposed on the o-the-equilibrium-path punishments that follow deviations, not explicitly as a coercion game.
"
A recent literature has taken an incomplete-contracts approach to international trade agreements and dispute settlement e.g. Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger (2007) , Beshkar (2010) , Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010) , Maggi and Staiger (2011) and Beshkar and Bond (2012) .
Its main focus is on the design of optimal institutions for international trade and dispute settlement in various informational/contractual environments. In contrast, the international organization's dispute settlement procedure is the main exogenous variable in our model. Our aim is not to study the normative aspects of trade institutions but, instead, to provide a positive theory of how commitment to such institutions may aect trade coercion outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, while section 3 presents the main results of our analysis. In section 4 we discuss the substantive implications of our results and relate them to the existing empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes.
! As we will discuss in section 2.2, this assumption is consistent with empirical evidence on US trade coercion.
" Other notable recent examples are Bagwell and Staiger (2005) , Martin and Vergote (2008), and Rosendor (2005) who analyze repeated tari games in which, as in our model, governments have private information about their relative valuations of import-competing sectors. Riezman (1991) and Hungerford (1991) also analyze repeated game settings with incomplete information but, in those papers, it is the countries' own levels of protection which are private information.
The Model
The goal of this section is twofold. We start by presenting the basic structure of the economy, and lie out next a simple model of trade coercion.
The Economic Environment
We consider a model with two large countries, Home and Foreign, trading between each other, which has been used in several previous analyses of trade negotiations.
# Each economy is characterized by three sectors, i = 0, 1, 2. All goods are produced using a constant-returnsto-scale technology and are sold under conditions of perfect competition. The freely traded good 0 serves as the numeraire and is produced using labor alone. We choose units so that the international and domestic prices are both equal to one. We assume that aggregate labor supply, L = L, is large enough to sustain production of a positive amount of good 0. This implies that in a competitive equilibrium the wage rate equals unity in each country. Goods 1 and 2 are manufactured using labor and a sector-specic input, which is available in xed supply. Home is abundant in sector-specic input 2, while Foreign is abundant in sector-specic input 1. As a result, Home imports good 1, while Foreign imports good 2. We assume symmetry in factor endowments between the two countries. The domestic and international prices of a nonnumeraire good i are denoted by p i and π i , respectively, and the rent R i , accruing to the specic factor in sector i, depends only on the producer price of the good, and can thus be
Trade policies in the two countries consist of ad valorem import taris or subsidies, denoted by τ and τ * , which drive a wedge between domestic and international prices.
$ In Home, the domestic price of good 1 is thus equal to p 1 = (1 + τ )π 1 , with τ > 0 (τ < 0) representing an import tari (subsidy); the domestic price of the export good is instead equal to p 2 = π 2 . In Foreign, domestic prices are given by p *
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents, and the size of the population is normalized to one. Each agent shares the same quasi-linear and additively separable preferences, which can be written as
where c 0 represents the consumption of the numeraire good, and c 1 and c 2 represent the consumption of the other goods. The subutility functions are assumed to be twice dierentiable, # See for instance Mayer (1981) and Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi (2012) .
$ Following Johnson (1954) and Mayer (1981) ), we restrict the set of policy tools available to import taris and subsidies. This allows us to describe the preferences of the two countries in the tari space (τ, τ * ) and to easily characterize trade negotiations between them. Levy (1999) , in his model of lobbying and international cooperation, has convincingly argued that export subsidies and taxes are rarely used, the only exception being probably agriculture.
increasing, and strictly concave.
Provided that income always exceeds the expenditure on the numeraire good, the domestic demand for good i ∈ {1, 2} can be expressed as a function of price alone, D i (p i ). Imports of good 1 by Home can then be written as
World product markets of goods 1 and 2 clear when
From (2) and (3) we can derive an expression for world equilibrium prices as a function of the policies in the two countries, i.e., π 1 (τ ), π 2 (τ * ). Tari revenues in Home are
and are assumed to be redistributed uniformly among all domestic residents.
Individuals derive income from several sources: they all supply one unit of labor and earn wages; they also receive the same lump sum transfer (possibly negative) of trade policy revenues from the government and they own the same share of the specic inputs used in the production of goods 1 and 2. We assume that the Home government seeks to maximize aggregate welfare, which is dened as the sum of the income of all citizens (total labor income, industry rents and government revenues), plus consumer surplus, i.e.:
where
i.e. the rst term describes the surplus from the consumption of good 1 and the second from the consumption of good 2.
Foreign is identical to Home, with one important exception. While in the Home country the political inuence of the import competing sector is normalized to one, in Foreign it is equal to
, and in the remainder of the paper γ will be referred to as the Foreign government's type.
% As a result the objective function of the Foreign government is given by: Each variant of the model describes a sequential game of incomplete information. We solve it by looking for (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibria, which are dened as follows: (a) the Home government's beliefs are generated by Bayesian updating whenever possible and (b) in each stage governments' actions are optimal, given their beliefs and their opponents' strategies.
In order to eliminate equilibria which rely on implausible beliefs o the equilibrium path, we use criterion D1 from Cho and Kreps (1987 ' In the remainder of the paper, any reference to an equilibrium is to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consistent with criterion D1.
International Trade Institutions and Coercion Outcomes
In this section we characterize in turn the equilibria that will emerge from the three institutional settings described in the previous section. 
Let the smallest value of τ that satises the above inequality be denoted by T (F ). This is the Home government's reservation demand, or the minimum demand it will accept rather than engage in a trade war. In what follows, we will sometimes indulge in a slight abuse of ' This is a strengthening of the Intuitive Criterion, which has no bite in this game. See the Appendix for the formal denition.
In order to limit the number of possible cases (without aecting the paper's conclusions), we also assume that in case of a tie, a player will prefer to agree than to disagree with the other player or the IO.
notation and denote by T (γ) the Home government's reservation tari when its beliefs assign probability 1 to type γ. Similarly, the type-γ Foreign government's reservation demand T * (γ)
that is, the Home tari at which the Foreign government is indierent between settling and engaging in a trade war is dened as the largest value of tari τ that satises
0 , γ) decreases as τ increases). It can be easily shown that T (γ) and T * (γ) are both strictly decreasing in γ. An increase in γ causes the trade-war tari of the Foreign government,τ
decreases withτ * (γ) (and therefore with γ), the Home government is willing to implement a lower tari to avoid a trade war. In contrast, applying the Envelope Theorem reveals that
, γ) increases with γ; so that greater political pressure from its import-competing sector makes the Foreign government less willing to tolerate high taris applied by Home.
To insure that the model always has an equilibrium, we assume throughout our analysis that
. This assumption implies that there is no room for compromise when the Foreign government is not prepared to resort to high retaliatory taris.
The ineectiveness of unilateral coercion. Can the Foreign government obtain a concession from the Home government in equilibrium? This question is answered in the following Proposition 1. Suppose that there is no IO so that coercion must be unilateral. There exists an equilibrium and, in any equilibrium, the Foreign government always fails to obtain a concession from the Home government. Proof. See Appendix A.1.
To understand the intuition for this result, note that upon observing the demand τ by the Foreign government, the Home government uninformed about the level of political pressure γ that has emerged in the Foreign country updates its beliefs. Given these new beliefs, say
F , it concedes to τ if and only if τ ≥ T (F ). As its reservation demand T (γ) is decreasing in
γ, the best strategy for the Foreign government is to signal high values of γ by requiring a low level of τ . Indeed, trade wars are less costly to Foreign governments that are very sensitive to the wellbeing of the import sector (characterized by a high-γ) the Foreign reservation demand T * (γ) decreases with γ and the Foreign government is therefore more likely to risk a trade war when γ is large. Understanding this, the Home government rationally infers higher values of γ from a demand for a lower tari. Such beliefs lead the foreign policy-maker to go too far, however, and to make requests which the Home government is not prepared to meet.
This signaling spiral leads all types of Foreign government to make unsuccessful demands, and a trade war will ensue in every equilibrium.
Coercive Trade Policy with Full Commitment to the IO
We now turn to the analysis of the consequences of full commitment to the IO on trade coercion outcomes. One of the questions this paper seeks to answer is how international trade institutions, despite their lack of enforcement power, can be eective in settling disputes. We have just shown how the logic of unilateral trade coercion locks the Foreign government into signaling spirals leading to trade wars. Despite being unable to enforce its rulings, can the IO's dispute settlement process do a better job of obtaining concessions from the Home government?
The answer is positive, and the intuition is that full commitment to the IO's dispute settlement process may oer the Foreign government an opportunity to break the spiral of unilateral coercion. To see how this can occur in equilibrium, suppose that τ io ≥ T (F 0 ). Proposition 2. Suppose the Foreign government is fully committed to the IO so that coercion must be multilateral. There always exists an equilibrium, and the following is true in any equilibrium:
, then: either all types of Foreign government obtain the concession τ io ; or they all make unsuccessful demands following which the Home government complies with the IO ruling.
(ii) if τ io < T (F 0 ), then all types of Foreign government make unsuccessful demands following which the Home government fails to comply with the IO ruling. Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Combined with Proposition 1, Proposition 2 shows that an international organization can aect the outcome of trade coercion and prevent trade wars, even though it has no enforcement power. It also suggests a possible explanation for why trade coercion appears to be more eective in obtaining concessions from target governments when conducted multilaterally. We will elaborate on the empirical and normative implications of the equilibrium analysis in Section 4.
3.3
Coercive Proposition 3. Suppose the Foreign government is only partially committed to the IO so that it can choose between unilateral and multilateral coercion. There exists an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government coerce unilaterally and fail to obtain a concession. In addition, a trade war arises with probability one in any equilibrium. Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In other words, partial commitment to the IO yields the same outcome as absence of membership: In both cases, the Foreign government fails to obtain a concession from the Home government, and a trade war ensues.
Note though that the Foreign government's coercive policy has now two components: the demand τ and the method of coercion (unilateral vs. multilateral) through which this demand is made. A deviation from multilateral to unilateral coercion in this case conveys the same signal as a deviation to a smaller demand in the absence of an IO: the Home government therefore
anticipates tougher retaliatory measures in case of a trade war. As in the unilateral-coercion game, such beliefs induce the Home government to concede to lower unilateral demands. This in turn drives the Home government to (unilaterally) ask for even lower taris until its demands become unacceptable.
These incentives to coerce unilaterally to signal high resolve can only disappear when in equilibrium all types of Foreign government make unsuccessful demands (either unilaterally or multilaterally), thus leading to a trade war. In this case, the Home government interprets any deviation by its foreign counterpart as an attempt to escape this outcome and, consequently, infers that the Foreign government's type γ must be low. It is therefore optimal for the Home government to only accept demands so high that the Foreign government prefers to engage in a trade war.
Implications
Our theoretical model provides novel insights on the inuence of international trade institutions on coercion outcomes. Importantly, our results are consistent with the stylized facts that have been uncovered in the existing empirical literature. In this section we briey review these empirical ndings and explain how they relate to our analysis.
Unilateral vs. multilateral coercion: the inuence of international trade institutions. Busch and Reinhardt (2000) observe that, during the GATT period, only two-fths of the rulings in favor of the complainant resulted in full compliance by the defendant whereas in nearly a third of the cases, defendants failed to comply at all. Even though the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism improved the situation, as Rossmiller (1994) pointed out, the WTO remains a court with no baili. These observations prompt the following question: Can a multilateral institution inuence coercion outcomes despite its lack of enforcement power? Empirical evidence uncovered by Pelc (2010) , suggests that this is indeed the case. Focusing on the US experience between 1975 and 2000, he nds that disputes that went through the GATT, rather than relying only on Section 301, are 34 percentage points more likely to result in a concession.
Pelc (2010) suggests that it is the perceived illegitimacy of unilateral coercion and the importance of reputation which decrease the likelihood of a target conceding. While resistance to institutionally constrained demands entails the reputational cost of being branded a violator, resistance to unilateral threats regarded as illegitimate by the rest of the world yields a reputational benet: It decreases the likelihood of being unilaterally targeted again in the future. Our formal analysis provides an alternative rationale, which focuses on the role played by the sender government's incentives. On the one hand, unilateral coercion creates signaling spirals leading the sender government to make unacceptable demands. On the other, commit-ment to a multilateral organization can break these spirals and allow the sender government to obtain concessions.
Early dispute settlements. Analyzing evidence on more than 600 GATT/WTO disputes from 1948 through 1999, Busch and Reinhardt (2000) observe that in a majority of cases (about 55%), no panel was ever established, and a further 8% of them ended prior to the issuance of a panel report. Paraphrasing them, a key question is why should target governments settle early given that they can spurn adverse rulings with impunity. They argue that the source of early concessions lies in the normative power of GATT/WTO rulings and in the pressure to abide by the norm: An adverse ruling may weaken the target government's political position in its own country, as well as its position in ongoing multilateral trade talks. As a result, if the target government is uncertain about the IO ruling, then it may prefer to concede beforehand.
Consistently with the evidence, Proposition 2(i) shows that pre-ruling settlements may occur in equilibrium.
Importantly though, in our setting, the mechanism at work is dierent:
IO rulings do not convey any normative or reputational costs. When the Foreign government
anticipates an unfavorable IO ruling (i.e. when τ io ≥ T (F 0 )), it expects the Home government to comply with this ruling. This leads the Foreign government to abandon aggressive strategies, and to make more accommodating demands to which the Home government is willing to concede.
Thus, it is mainly the sender government's (rather than target's) incentives which are aected by the prospect of the IO decision.
An alternative rationale for international trade agreements. Our model suggests a possible explanation for another empirical puzzle: Given that membership in an international trade organization may limit the (coercive) policy discretion of a national government, why would the latter choose to join a supranational body? Most of the existing literature on this topic suggests that states become members of such institutions to solve the coordination problem created by the terms of trade externality from taris (e.g. Bagwell and Staiger 1999).
Our analysis reveals, however, that another driving force may emanate from informational asymmetries in trade coercion. By helping to explain why demands channeled through the multilateral system may be more successful than unilateral demands, our model provides a new rationale for states' commitment to multilateral institutions.
To see this, suppose that we add an initial stage to the game in which the Foreign government decides whether or not to fully commit to the IO. If τ io < T (F 0 ), then it is indifferent between all institutional arrangements: a trade war is inevitable. Suppose instead that
The proof of Proposition 2 (Section A.2 in the Appendix) shows that something even stronger is true if τ io > T * (γ): in all equilibria the Foreign government obtains an early concession from the Home government.
In fact, Busch and Reinhardt (2000) point out that among those disputes ending prior to a ruling, 67%
exhibit full or partial concession by the target government. At the same time, the US retained access to the dispute settlement system provided by the GATT-WTO (Pelc 2010).
As argued by Pelc (2010) the availability of unilateral coercion did not deliver the expected results, and in fact the US ultimately found it in its interest to ... push for greater formal constraints in the Uruguay Round that ultimately raised the costs of unilateralism further. In our model, if we allowed the Foreign government to choose between full and partial commitment to the IO, then it would strictly prefer the former whenever were not available, incentives to signal higher levels of resolve to the Home government by deviating from multilateral to unilateral coercion eventually lead the Foreign government to make unacceptable demands (Subsection 3.3). These incentives are reminiscent of Reinhardt (2000) observation that taking a dispute to the GATT was a signal of the complainant's lack of resolve.
Concluding Remarks
This paper is a rst attempt at analyzing the strategic interactions that underlie coercive trade policy. We have studied trade coercion in settings where sender governments may show their resolve by demanding more concessions from target governments. We have seen how the temptation to exaggerate can reduce the likelihood of targets conceding. This problem is especially severe when the sender government is not (fully) committed to a multilateral dispute settlement mechanism. Then, unbound by international commitments, the sender may make excessive demands which are unacceptable to its target. Institutions through which demands are channeled thus matter to coercion outcomes. In accordance with empirical evidence, our results indicate that full commitment to (even weak) multilateral trade institutions makes trade coercion more eective in obtaining concessions from target governments.
There are a number of research avenues opened up by our results, two of which we will briey discuss. First, our positive theory of the impact of multilateral institutions on trade coercion outcomes naturally prompts a normative question: What would an optimal dispute settlement mechanism be in the presence of informational asymmetries?
! Answering this question would require a richer framework, i.e. one that would further our understanding of the eects of settlement mechanisms both on membership in international trade institutions and on target governments' policy choices that are likely to trigger coercive responses.
As we noted at the outset (c.f. footnote 8), our analysis focused on coercion itself and not on its ultimate origin. It would be interesting to investigate why do dissatised governments use coercion instead of potentially more ecient bargaining approaches. Trade coercion typically involves two policy instruments: the target's trade policy which is the source of the sender's discontent, and the sender's policy which is only used as a retaliation instrument. By focusing its demand on the former instrument, the sender government leaves out mutually advantageous agreements which would be available if its demand would involve instead a combination of both instruments. But we leave this as a topic for future research. Claim 1: Suppose that the Foreign government can only coerce unilaterally. In any equilibrium, the Home government never concedes to its demands. Proof. First of all, observe that only one demand can successfully be made in equilibrium. To see this, suppose that two dierent demands τ 1 and τ 2 are made in equilibrium by types γ 1 and γ 2 , respectively. Assume without loss of generality that τ 1 < τ 2 . By denition of an equilibrium, ! Maggi and Staiger (2011) answer a similar question, but in a complete-information setting where states of the world are vague and subject to interpretation by contracting governments. type γ 2 must nd it protable to make successful demand τ 2 ; hence, T * (γ 2 ) ≥ τ 2 > τ 1 . implies that demanding τ ′ is a protable deviation for the type-γ sup Foreign government, giving the desired contradiction. As a consequence, Γ τ is either a singleton or an empty set.
(2) Suppose γ τ is the unique type that makes a successful demand τ in some equilibrium.
Bayesian updating implies that demand τ fully reveals the type of the Foreign government.
either the Home government or the type-γ τ
Foreign government could protably deviate from their equilibrium strategies. From our as-
, this in turn implies that γ τ ̸ = γ. Now take any type γ < γ τ .
By assumption, a trade war occurs when the Foreign government is of type γ (γ τ is the only type that makes a successful demand). As T 
, such a deviation would not be protable.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove Proposition 2 in four steps. Steps 1 and 2 show that, in any equilibrium, either all types of Foreign government successfully demand τ io or they all make unsuccessful demands.
Step 3 shows that all types successfully demand τ io in any equilibrium if and only if τ io ≥ T (F 0 ).
Finally,
Step 4 shows that a trade war never arises in equilibrium when τ io ≥ T (F 0 ), and that all types make obtain concession τ io when τ io > T * (γ). Finally, Step 5 proves existence of and characterizes equilibria when τ io < T (F 0 ), showing that: all types of Foreign government fail to obtain a concession from the Home government; and the latter never complies with the IO ruling thus completing the proof of the proposition.
Step 1: If the Foreign government makes a successful demand in equilibrium, then this demand must be τ io .
Consider an equilibrium in which a demand τ is successfully made by a nonempty set of Foreign-government types Γ τ . Let F be the Home government's updated beliefs after receiving this demand. Obviously, τ is the only successful proposal made in equilibrium otherwise all types making the highest demands could protably deviate by making the lowest demand. As it is optimal for the Home government to concede to τ , we must have τ ≥ τ io . Now suppose by contradiction that τ > τ io . As T * is a decreasing function and indierent players prefer agreements over disagreements, the set of types demanding τ must be of the
. We distinguish between two dierent cases:
• Case 1: γ 0 > γ. In this case, we have τ ≥ max {T (F ), τ • Case 2: γ 0 = γ. In this case, demand τ reveals that the Foreign government's type is γ. As it is optimal for the Home government to concede to τ , we must have τ ≥ max
. But this implies that the type-γ Foreign government could protably deviate by making an unacceptable demand τ ′ < τ io (whether this leads to compliance with τ io or with a trade war, it ends up strictly better o ).
Step 2: In any equilibrium, either all types of Foreign government successfully demand τ io or they all make unsuccessful demands. Bayesian updating implies that the Home government's beliefs assign zero probability to the event {γ ≤ γ 0 } following demand τ ′ . As T (·) is strictly decreasing in γ, this in turn implies that Step 3: There is an equilibrium in which all types make a successful demand if and only if
Necessity. If all types of Foreign government demand τ
io in equilibrium, then the Home government's beliefs when receiving this demand are given by F 0 . As a consequence, we must 
for all τ 1 ∈ T 1 and all τ 2 ∈ T 2 . However, in equilibrium, the Home government prefers τ io to a trade war after rejecting τ 1 and (strictly) prefers a trade war to τ io after rejecting τ 2 ; that is Step 5: If τ io < T (F 0 ), then: (i) all types of Foreign government fail to obtain a concession from the Home government; and (ii) the latter never complies with the IO ruling. Such an equilibrium exists.
Suppose that τ io < T (F 0 ). Part (i) is an immediate consequence of Steps 2 and 3. To prove part (ii), suppose that there is an equilibrium in which a nonempty set of types of Foreign government, say Γ io , make unsuccessful demands followed by compliance with τ io . Observe
: a nonempty subset of types must make unsuccessful demands followed by trade wars. To see this, suppose instead that all types' demands lead the Home government to comply with τ io . Letting F τ denote the Home government's beliefs following demand τ , this would imply that τ io ≥ T (F τ ) for all on-the-equilibrium-path demands τ and, therefore, that
By denition of an equilibrium, γ ∈ Γ io if and only if T * (γ) ≥ τ 0 (otherwise γ could protably deviate by mimicking a type outside Γ io ). As T * is a strictly decreasing function, there exists a threshold type γ 0 < γ such that
. This implies that, when the Home government receives a demand τ ′ from a type outside Γ io , its updated beliefs F ′ assign a zero probability to the event {γ ≤ γ 0 }. We now have to prove that such an equilibrium exists. We argue that the following strategy prole and system of beliefs constitute an equilibrium: All types of foreign government demand τ io ; the Home government concedes to demand τ if and only if τ ≥ T ( γ )
; it never complies with the IO ruling; and it believes that the Foreign government's type is γ if the latter demands τ ̸ = τ io , and maintains its initial beliefs F 0 otherwise.
To see that the Foreign government does not have a protable deviation, observe that it could only change the equilibrium outcome (i.e. a trade war) by making a demand τ ≥ T
, this would be unprotable to all Foreign government's types
As the Home government's beliefs are F 0 when it receives demand τ io and τ io < T (F 0 ), it is optimal for it not comply with ruling τ io after rejecting demand τ
io . This in turn implies that it is also optimal to reject demand τ io . When it receives a demand τ ̸ = τ io , the Home government believes that the Foreign government is of type γ.
optimal for the Home government to trigger a trade war by rejecting the IO ruling. This in turn implies that it is a best response to concede to demand τ if and only if τ ≥ T
Finally, it is readily checked that the Home government's beliefs satisfy Bayes' rule whenever possible. Moreover, Lemma 5 shows that they also satisfy criterion D1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We prove Proposition 3 in two steps:
Step 1: There exists an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government coerce unilaterally and fail to obtain a concession.
Let κ be a strictly positive number and consider the following strategy prole and beliefs:
The type-γ Foreign government makes unilateral demand τ κ (γ) ≡ T (γ) − κ; the Home government concedes to a unilateral demand τ if and only if τ ≥ T ( γ )
; concedes to a multilateral demand τ if and only if τ ≥ max
it complies with the IO ruling if and only if
; it believes that the Foreign government is of type γ when it is confronted with
, and that it is of type γ when confronted with any other demand.
To see that these strategy prole and system of beliefs constitute an equilibrium, note rst that the Home government's beliefs are consistent with Bayes' rule whenever possible.
Moreover, Lemma 6, shows that they are reasonable. The Foreign government can only change the outcome by making either a unilateral demand τ ≥ T
, however, such deviations can only make it worse o. Finally, it is readily checked that, given its beliefs, the Home government's strategy is a best response to the Foreign government's.
Step 2: In any equilibrium, a trade war arises with a probability of one.
To prove this statement, we will establish in turn that in equilibrium: (i) if all types of Foreign government make unilateral demands, then the Home government never concedes; (ii) if all types make multilateral demands, then the Home government never concedes to those demands and never complies with the IO ruling; and (iii) if some types coerce unilaterally and others multilaterally, then all their demands are unsuccessful and lead to a trade war.
(i) If all types coerce unilaterally in equilibrium, then by the same argument as in Proposition 1 they all fail to obtain a concession (all deviations available in the game without IO are still available). Hence, a tarde war ensues for all possible realizations of the Foreign government's type.
(ii) Consider an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government coerce multilaterally, and suppose (by contradiction) that some type's demand does not lead to a trade war. By the same argument as in Proposition 2, this implies that τ io ≥ T (F 0 ) and that all types' demands lead to the implementation of τ io . This in turn implies that τ io ≤ T * (γ) otherwise the type-γ Foreign government could protably deviate by making an unacceptable unilateral demand τ ′ < T (γ). Lemma 7 shows that, in such a case, reasonable beliefs must assign a probability of 1 to type γ following any (o-the-equilibrium-path) unilateral demand τ ′ < τ
io .
Now consider a deviation to unilateral demand
As the Home government believes that this demand emanates from the type-γ government, it should concede to it. This makes the deviation protable for all types of Foreign government.
(iii) Consider an equilibrium in which
can be partitioned into two nonempty subsets Γ 1
and Γ 2 such that all types in Γ 1 [resp. Γ 2 ] coerce multilaterally [resp. unilaterally]. Proceeding by contradiction, assume that in this equilibrium, a trade war is avoided for some realization of the Foreign government's type. By the same argument as in Proposition 1, all types in Γ 2 fail to obtain a concession; so that a trade war occurs if γ ∈ Γ 2 . Therefore, the types avoiding a trade war must be in Γ 1 . By the same argument as in Proposition 2, tari τ io must then be implemented whenever the Foreign government's type is in Γ 1 .
By denition of an equilibrium, types in Γ 1 cannot protably deviate by mimicking types in Γ 2 , and vice versa. As T * (γ) is strictly decreasing in γ, this implies that there must be a
; and γ 0 < γ because by assumption Γ 2 ̸ = ∅.) We distinguish between two dierent cases:
implies that there must a demand τ emanating from some type, or some subset of types, in Γ 1 such that the Home government's updated beliefs F τ satisfy T (F τ ) > τ
io . This in turn implies that it is optimal for the Home government to reject both demand τ and ruling τ io in order to trigger a trade war this is a contradiction.
Observe that this demand is only made o the equilibrium path: types γ ≤ γ 0 make multilateral demands, and types γ > γ 0 make unsuccessful demands (as T (γ) < T (γ 0 ) < τ ′ for all γ > γ 0 , the Home government would concede to τ ′ if it emanated from types γ > γ 0 in equilibrium).
Furthermore, Lemma 8 shows that the Home government's beliefs F ′ when it receives unilateral demand τ ′ must assign zero probability to the event {γ < γ 0 }; 
, this deviation is protable to all types in Γ 1 this is again a contradiction.
B Reasonable Beliefs
As explained in the main text, there is a unique equilibrium in the trade-war continuation game, in which the type-γ Foreign government always choosesτ * (γ) and the Home government always choosesτ . Similarly, the Home government's decision of whether or not to concede when confronted with the international organization's ruling τ io is uniquely determined by sequential rationality.
However, multiplicity arises in the earlier stages of the model where, anticipating equilibrium moves in subsequent subgames, governments play a signaling game. In order to rule out PBEs supported by unreasonable beliefs o the equilibrium path, we concentrate on pure strategy equilibria that satisfy Cho' and Kreps' (1987) criterion D1 (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, and Ramey 1996) . 
. In addition, τ ′ < τ implies that:
Take an arbitrary type γ ∈ 
(Our restrictions on τ ′ ensure that any α ∈ [0, 1] is a best response for some beliefs.) This inequality can be rewritten as
, the sign of the derivative ofᾱ is the same as the sign of
(The equality follows from the Envelope Theorem:τ * (γ) is the maximizer of w * (·) + γΠ *
(·).)
Hence,ᾱ is strictly decreasing. 
This implies that, for any
, then any α ∈ [0, 1] may be a best response. As all types of foreign government make unsuccessful demands in equilibrium, we have
. Therefore, beliefs which assign a probability of 1 to type γ following any (o-the-
are reasonable.
By the same argument as above, it is impossible to eliminate type γ using criterion D1.
Coercion with Full Commitment to the IO Lemma 3. Consider an equilibrium in which a set of types of the form
, make a successful demand τ > τ io . Reasonable beliefs must assign zero probability to all types γ < γ 0 following any (o-the-equilibrium-path) demand τ
Proof. 
, it does not concede to the international organization's ruling), then we must distinguish between three dierent cases: 
(The argument is the same as in the proof of Lemma 1).) Hence,ᾱ is strictly increasing. This 
As T * (γ) is strictly decreasing in γ, this implies that, for any beliefs
for all γ ∈ Γ. We have thus proved that the latter relation is true for all possible beliefs and, 
(so that γ cannot be eliminated).
Suppose rst that τ ′ < τ io . In this case, it is never a best response for the domestic government for any beliefs F it may have (it receives max 
) then the unique best response for the domestic government is to accept τ ′ with zero probability:
Therefore, all types of foreign government are indierent between their equilibrium demand and τ
We have thus showed that the following is true for all domestic government's beliefs F :
. It is therefore impossible to eliminate type γ.
Coercion with Partial Commitment to the IO
Observe that, in this version of the model, the Foreign government makes two choices: a coercion mode and a demand to the Home government. Therefore, a deviation is now of the form (τ ′ , c) where c ∈ {u, m} is the coercion mode adopted by the Foreign government when it deviates u meaning unilateral, and m multilateral.
Lemma 6. Consider an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government make unsuccessful unilateral demands. Beliefs that assign a probability of 1 to type γ following any o-theequilibrium-path demand are reasonable. Proof. We can apply the same argument as in Lemma 2 to show that beliefs assigning a , with γ 0 = (T * ) −1 (τ io ), make multilateral demands followed by the implementation of tari τ io ; and all types in (γ 0 , γ] make unsuccessful unilateral demands. Reasonable beliefs must assign zero probability to all types γ ≤ γ 0 following any (o-the-equilibrium-path) unilateral demand τ ′ ∈ (T (γ 0 ) , τ io ).
Proof. prove that all types γ ≤ γ 0 must be eliminated according to the D1 criterion.
